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Insider Trading and Soft Information: U.S. v. Nacchio 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Joseph Nacchio, former CEO of Qwest, is currently serving a six-
year sentence for insider trading. Nacchio was convicted of insider 
trading after he exercised his Qwest stock options at the same time 
he received information that Qwest’s 2001 earnings were in danger 
of falling nearly one billion dollars short of projected revenue 
estimates. Nacchio’s case is unique because it demonstrates the 
importance of following proper procedure when introducing expert 
testimony in a criminal trial under the Daubert standard, as well as 
the difficulty of determining “materiality” in an insider trading case 
based on “soft” information.  
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Nacchio II is problematic for two 
reasons: first, the court conflated the requirements of Rule 16 
disclosures and the Daubert standard for qualifying experts by 
creating an onerous burden on defendants attempting to admit 
expert testimony at the early stages of trial. Additionally, Nacchio II’s 
stringent “soft” information requirement may discourage companies 
from disclosing accurate or ambitious revenue projections to the 
public given the potential liability for insider trading if internal 
documents question the accuracy of those projections. Investors may 
thus be left with less information to inform their investment 
decisions. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Qwest’s 2001 Earnings Estimates 
In September 2000, Qwest made public its 2001 earnings 
projections. Qwest CEO Nacchio1 announced the company’s 
projected total revenue would be in the range of $21.3 to $21.7 
billion.2 Qwest also prepared internal targets higher than the 
projections announced publicly.3 
 
 1. Time magazine named Nacchio one of the top fifty “Cyber Elites” in 1998. TIME 
DIGITAL ARCHIVE, Jan. 7, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/digital/cyberelite/32.html. At 
one point his net worth was estimated at $170 million. Id. Nacchio has also been described as 
“[b]rash and outspoken.” Id. 
 2. United States v. Nacchio (Nacchio I), 519 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008); see 
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Qwest officials soon became concerned that the public 
projections were too high. Qwest executives, including Nacchio, 
received a “risk estimate” forecasting a potential shortfall in 2001 
earnings. The memo indicated earnings could end up nearly $900 
million below the public projections. This shortfall was based on 
Qwest’s failure to account for changes in revenue streams. 
Specifically, Qwest had traditionally counted on revenues from long-
term leases of space on Qwest’s network known as “indefeasible 
rights of use” (“IRUs”). Qwest collected the lease payment at the 
beginning of the lease, and thus, IRU sales produced one-time 
revenue rather than a perpetual stream of income. As the public 
projections failed to account for these revenue streams drying up, the 
risk estimate indicated Qwest would have to make an “aggressive 
pivot” or “shift” from IRUs to other consistent streams of revenue 
to meet projections.4 Nacchio further understood that a slow start to 
2001 could have a “snowball effect” on the rest of the year’s 
earnings.5 Nacchio acknowledged this reality when he told his sales 
staff that “something big” had to happen by April or earnings would 
fall short of estimates.6 
Qwest met its projected earnings in the first two quarters of 
2001. However, in early April, Qwest’s executive vice president 
informed Nacchio that the IRU market was drying up. In late April 
2001, Nacchio discussed Qwest’s earnings estimates with investors. 
Nacchio told investors the company was “still confirming” company 
projections. When asked to break down the company’s revenue 
streams into recurring streams and one-time transactions, Nacchio 
refused.7 When further pressed about how Qwest planned to meet its 
 
also United States v. Nacchio (Nacchio II), 555 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009) (directing the 
reader to Nacchio I for the full factual background). 
 3. The internal targets were set higher than the public projections to encourage 
employees to exceed public projections. Performance bonuses were also based on the internal 
targets. Nacchio I, 519 F.3d at 1145. 
 4. Id. To achieve its revenue projections, Qwest would have had to double its growth 
rate for recurring revenue. Nacchio knew in December 2000 that the shift from IRUs to 
recurring revenue had to take place early in 2001, or the company would have to revise its 
public projections downward. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
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revenue projections, Nacchio merely responded that “Qwest had 
better products and better management.”8 
B. Nacchio’s Stock Sales 
Nacchio, as is common for corporate executives, received a 
substantial portion of his salary in stock options.9 In October 2000, 
Nacchio announced that he planned to exercise his options and sell 
one million shares of Qwest stock per quarter. However, Nacchio 
did not enter into a fixed sales plan until February 2001. After Qwest 
stock dropped below $38 a share less than a month later, Nacchio 
cancelled his fixed sales plan and determined he would sell, as he 
traditionally had done, during quarterly trading windows.10  
During the second quarter trading window in 2001, Nacchio 
sold over 1.2 million shares of Qwest stock. At this time, Qwest 
stock traded between $37 and $42 a share. Accordingly, Nacchio 
made over $50 million from the sale of his options. While the 
number of options Nacchio sold was slightly more than the one 
million shares per quarter he announced in October 2000, it was 
four times the average number of shares he sold from 1998 to 2000. 
After this trading window had closed, Nacchio entered into another 
fixed sales plan approved by Qwest’s general counsel. At the end of 
May 2001, Qwest’s stock price again dropped below $38 a share. 
Nacchio sold no more shares after this point. Nacchio eventually 
“finished the year with more vested options than he had owned at 
the beginning” of the year.11 
In mid-August 2001, Qwest disclosed its lagging IRU sales in an 
SEC filing. Initially, the impact on Qwest stock was negligible. Later, 
on September 10, 2001, Nacchio lowered the company’s public 
earning projections by one billion dollars. One company executive 
testified at trial that Nacchio announced the revised company 
earnings projections separately from the SEC filing because he 
wanted it to seem that he had not been concealing information. By 
the end of September, Qwest’s stock was trading at 40% of its 
January price. 12 
 
 8. Id. at 1146. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 1147. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1148. 
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C. Nacchio’s Prosecution and Trial 
After a lengthy investigation, Nacchio was indicted and charged 
with forty-two counts of insider trading. The government accused 
Nacchio of trading on the basis of  
material nonpublic information about Qwest—specifically that the 
company was relying heavily on IRU sales, a non-recurring source 
of revenue to meet its first and second quarter public guidance, and 
that the company had not made the needed shift to recurring 
revenue which placed the company at substantial risk of not 
meeting its year-end guidance.13 
Three days before trial, Nacchio announced he would be calling 
an expert witness. The government requested a summary of the 
expert’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16(b)(1)(c) (“Rule 16”), which Nacchio provided.14 The 
government, however, argued that the summary did not comply with 
the requirements of Rule 16. The district court agreed with the 
government and concluded that Nacchio’s expert testimony “offered 
no bases or reasons whatsoever for [the expert’s] opinions contained 
in the summary.”15 
Nacchio later submitted a revised summary of his expert’s 
testimony. In the revised disclosure, Nacchio listed the expert’s 
numerous qualifications as an academic, researcher, and teacher in 
law and finance. The summary also explained that the expert had 
“analyzed Qwest’s [revenue projections], its actual stock 
performance, and reaction from the investment community; Qwest’s 
[revenue projections] compared to the [revenue projections] history 
of other telecommunications firms; and various facets of Qwest’s 
revenue from indefeasible rights of use.”16 In a sixty-three page 
motion to dismiss, the government challenged the expert’s testimony 
and moved to exclude it. The government again argued that Nacchio 
had not complied with Rule 16 and further contended that the 
expert’s methodology was unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.17 The district 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1149. 
 15. Nacchio II, 555 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 16. Id. at 1238. 
 17. Nacchio I, 519 F.3d at 1149 (“‘Daubert’ is legal shorthand for the district court’s 
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court again sided with the government and excluded the expert’s 
testimony.18 
The district court questioned the expert’s methodology and 
found that it did not comply with Daubert or Rule 702. The district 
court was particularly concerned with the expert’s methodology.19 
The district judge found that the expert’s methodology was 
“absolutely undisclosed” and that Nacchio had made no attempt to 
“establish that [the expert’s] testimony [was] the product of reliable 
principles and methods or that [the expert] applied some principles 
and methods reliably.”20 Thus, the court did not allow Nacchio’s 
expert to testify before the jury as an expert, despite last-ditch efforts 
by Nacchio’s defense team.21 
After trial and six days of jury deliberation, the jury convicted 
Nacchio on nineteen counts of insider trading. Nacchio was 
sentenced to six years imprisonment on each count to be served 
concurrently, two year’s supervised release, a $19 million fine, and 
forfeiture of $52 million.22 
D. Tenth Circuit Three-Judge Panel 
Nacchio promptly appealed the jury verdict to the Tenth Circuit. 
Nacchio challenged the district court’s decision to exclude his expert 
witness and questioned the sufficiency of the evidence before the 
jury.23 The Tenth Circuit agreed with Nacchio that the district 
court’s decision to exclude his expert testimony was reversible 
error.24 The court did not, however, agree that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict.25 
 
obligation to test a proposed expert’s methodology in advance of his testimony.”); see also 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); FED. R. EVID. 702.  
 18. Nacchio II, 555 F.3d at 1239, 1263 (concluding that the deficiencies in Nacchio’s 
disclosures were so glaring that “they hardly warrant[ed] the 63 pages of ink the Government 
has spilled in opposing the testimony”). 
 19. Id. at 1239. 
 20. Id. (noting that there was only “one ‘woefully inadequate’ sentence” discussing the 
process undertaken by the expert to inform himself of the facts of the case). 
 21. Id. After the district judge excluded the expert testimony, Nacchio’s lawyer asked 
the judge if he could speak on the issue. Id. The judge refused to hear the attorney and said, “I 
have your motion, I have the government’s motion, I have your response. Any argument that 
you wish to make could have been put in the response.” Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Nacchio I, 519 F.3d 1140, 1148, 1166 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 24. Id. at 1148–49. 
 25. Id. at 1149. 
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1. Expert testimony 
In a split decision, the three-judge panel held that Nacchio’s 
expert testimony had been improperly excluded. The court first 
looked at Nacchio’s disclosures against the Rule 16 standard. Rule 
16, the panel explained, requires a defendant to disclose an expert’s 
“opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the 
[expert’s] qualifications.”26 The court noted that Rule 16 does not 
require extensive discussion of an expert’s methodology, rather the 
purpose of Rule 16 is to put the government on notice of the 
expert’s testimony to aid in trial preparation.27 
Here, the panel concluded that Nacchio’s Rule 16 disclosure 
“did exactly what the law required.”28 Rule 16 only requires that a 
defendant disclose a “written summary of any [expert] testimony” 
and “describe the witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those 
opinions, and the witness’s qualifications.”29 The disclosure, the 
court explained, stated that the expert’s opinion was “based on” his 
analysis of Nacchio’s trades, stock price data, and executive options.30 
Likewise, the disclosure stated the expert’s reasoning; specifically, 
that “principles of risk reduction and the pattern of [Nacchio’s] sales 
were inconsistent with” insider trading.31 Thus, the panel concluded 
that Nacchio had fully complied with the requirements of Rule 16. 
Finally, the panel concluded that the district court had used the 
Rule 16 disclosure process as a substitute for a Daubert hearing. Rule 
16, the court explained, is “not designed to allow the district court 
to move immediately to a Daubert determination without briefs.”32 
The panel acknowledged that the government had a right to demand 
a Daubert hearing, but ultimately made clear that Rule 16 
disclosures do not have to comply with Daubert.33 
 
 26. Id. at 1150. 
 27. Id. at 1151. 
 28. Id. The court reasoned that perhaps the district court had confused the civil and 
criminal standard for expert testimony. In criminal trials, unlike civil cases, an expert “is not 
required to present and disclose” his testimony before trial. Id. at 1152. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1151. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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2. Sufficiency of the evidence 
Nacchio challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on three 
grounds. First, Nacchio alleged that the information related to 
Qwest’s revenue streams was not material. Second, he argued that he 
did not act with willful intent, or scienter. Finally, he argued that 
even if the information regarding Qwest’s revenue was material, it 
was not a factor in his decision to trade. Ultimately, the Tenth 
Circuit rejected each of these challenges.34 
a. Materiality. On de novo review, the court looked at the jury 
instructions “to determine whether they accurately informed the jury 
of the governing law.”35 The key jury instruction charged the jury to 
determine “whether the . . . matter omitted was of such importance 
that it could reasonably be expected to cause a person to act or not 
to act with respect to the securities transaction at issue.”36 Nacchio 
contended this instruction was faulty because it failed to incorporate 
the concepts of probability and magnitude. Nevertheless, the court 
found that this instruction did not violate the Supreme Court’s test 
for materiality, namely, that the “significance the reasonable investor 
would place on the withheld . . . information” is the test for 
materiality.37 
The court also rejected Nacchio’s proposed jury instruction 
modeled after the “bespeaks caution” rule in false-statement cases.38 
The “bespeaks caution” rule essentially holds that if a speaker 
qualifies a statement, someone hearing the statement should be wary 
of it. Nacchio argued that because Qwest issued its public 
projections in cautious tones, investors should have been wary of 
Qwest’s performance, and thus, traded carefully. As a result, Nacchio 
argued, had he disclosed the information regarding the slowing 
revenue streams before trading, investors, who were already wary 
because of the qualified public projection statements, would not 
have changed the way they traded Qwest stock, and thus, the 
information was not material.39 The court concluded even though 
 
 34. Id. at 1158. 
 35. Id. at 1158–59 (quoting United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 834 (10th 
Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 36. Id. at 1159. 
 37. Id. (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988)). 
 38. Id. at 1161. 
 39. Id. at 1161–62. 
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“the information already made available [to investors] was couched 
in warnings[, it] does not make new information (such as the 
information that IRUs constitute a dangerously high part of 
revenues and that opportunities for new IRU sales were drying up) 
immaterial.”40 After all, the court concluded, the issue is not whether 
the information the company disclosed was materially misleading, 
but whether the information on which Nacchio traded was 
material.41 
b. Scienter. Nacchio argued before the Tenth Circuit “that he 
traded in good faith and did not ‘willfully’ violate [laws against 
insider trading].”42 Specifically, Nacchio complained that portions of 
the district judge’s instruction regarding “bad faith” were 
improper.43 The Tenth Circuit reviewed the instructions relating to 
bad faith and concluded that while the instructions “might have 
been clearer,” the instructions did not prevent the jury from coming 
to a proper determination regarding Nacchio’s willful conduct.44 
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence presented 
by the government at trial was sufficient for the jury to infer that 
Nacchio “acted with the purpose to disobey the law or the 
knowledge that he was doing so.”45 Reviewing the evidence 
presented, the court noted Nacchio had several conversations with 
other Qwest officials that could be reasonably interpreted as efforts 
at concealing material information from investors. The most 
damning testimony came from a Qwest official who suggested to 
Nacchio that the revised earnings projections needed to be made 
public as soon as possible. Nacchio, the official testified, questioned 
whether the information needed to be made public. “Why do 
[investors] need to know?” Nacchio asked.46 The official responded 
that investors needed the IRU sales information to make an 
informed decision about Qwest stock, to which Nacchio replied, 
“[S]crew them, go tell them to buy.”47 Thus, the court concluded 
 
 40. Id. at 1162. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1164–65. 
 43. Id. at 1166. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1166–67. 
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that the jury was justified in finding that Nacchio knew and willfully 
concealed material inside information.48 
c. Connection of inside information to the questionable trades. In 
his final argument before the Tenth Circuit, Nacchio argued that 
“the jury could not have [reasonably] concluded that his trades were 
‘on the basis of’ inside information” as required by federal 
regulation.49 The trial judge instructed the jury that to convict 
Nacchio, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Nacchio “actually used material non-public information in 
deciding to trade,” not merely that he possessed the material non-
public information.50  
The Tenth Circuit indicated that this instruction may have been 
too favorable to Nacchio. Rule 10b5-1 from the Code of Federal 
Regulations states that an insider trades “on the basis of” material 
non-public information “so long as he is ‘aware’” of the 
information,51 unless the individual can rely on a safe-harbor 
provided by the rule.52 Thus, under this standard, Nacchio could 
have been found guilty merely because he was “aware” of the inside 
information when he traded, even if he had unrelated reasons for 
executing the stock sales.53 The court noted that because the jury 
received an instruction more favorable to Nacchio than the law 
requires and still convicted Nacchio, when reviewing the sufficiency 
of the evidence, it would “look to what the law actually requires 
rather than what the jury was instructed so long as the government 
objected to the instruction below.”54 The government did object to 
the instruction below and suggested an instruction stating the “jury 
must find that the information was ‘a factor, however small,’” in 
Nacchio’s decision to sell his options.55 Thus, the court explained, it 
did not need to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to 
 
 48. Id. at 1167. 
 49. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a)). 
 50. Id. (basing the jury instruction on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998), which was decided before Rule 10(b)(5)-1 was 
enacted). 
 51. Id. (quoting § 240.10b5-1(b)).  
 52. An automatic trading plan approved by the corporation is the most common safe 
harbor that protects persons with non-public material information from claims of insider 
trading. Id. (citing § 240.10b5-1(c)). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 1168. 
 55. Id. 
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demonstrate that Nacchio used the material non-public information 
as the basis for his trades, merely that it was a “factor, however 
small,” in his decision to sell his options.56 
Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court determined 
that a reasonable jury could have inferred that Nacchio knew in April 
and May of 2001 that the company’s earnings were sliding and that 
he acted upon this material non-public information when he sold his 
stock options. The court noted that Nacchio indeed had powerful 
explanations for his actions. Ultimately, however, it concluded the 
jury was justified in not believing Nacchio’s explanations because 
testimony amply demonstrated that Nacchio knew “Qwest had not 
made the necessary shift” from one-time to recurring revenue, and 
thus, corporate earnings were destined to drop.57 
3. Retrial 
Because the three-judge panel concluded that the trial court had 
improperly excluded the testimony of Nacchio’s expert, it reversed 
his conviction.58 However, the panel noted that the government 
could retry Nacchio a second time because the evidence presented 
for each element of insider trading was sufficient.59 
III. EN BANC REHEARING 
In February 2009, the Tenth Circuit granted rehearing en banc 
for the purpose of considering the expert testimony issue. In a 5-4 
split, the court held that the expert testimony was properly excluded 
at trial. Consequently, the court en banc upheld Nacchio’s 
conviction.60 
A. Expert Testimony 
The en banc panel began its analysis of the expert testimony issue 
by noting that it reviewed whether the district court properly 
 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 1169. 
 58. Id. Judge Holmes disagreed with the panel’s determination that the expert 
testimony was improperly excluded. See id. at 1170–75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 1169. The panel further concluded that it would be “unreasonably difficult to 
expect [the current trial judge] to retry the case with a fresh mind,” and thus, the panel 
ordered that a new trial judge be assigned. Id. at 1170. 
 60. Nacchio II, 555 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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performed its gatekeeping function under an abuse of discretion 
standard.61 Under the abuse of discretion standard, the en banc panel 
concluded that the district court properly performed its gatekeeping 
role.62 
The en banc panel rejected Nacchio’s argument (and the three-
judge panel’s conclusion) that the district court excluded the expert 
testimony on the supposed deficiencies of the Rule 16 disclosures.63 
The court reasoned that “by the time the district court ruled to 
exclude [the expert’s] testimony, it was clear that the court’s 
principal concern was Daubert.”64 Despite the fact that the district 
court’s decision to exclude was reached as the result of the 
government’s challenge to the Rule 16 disclosures, the en banc panel 
determined that statements made by the district court indicating that 
the expert’s methods did not comply with Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 (“Rule 702”), was undoubtedly “the primary rationale for the 
court’s decision.”65 The en banc panel labeled the references to Rule 
16 disclosures in the district court’s exclusion order as “ambiguous” 
and “enigmatic,”66 and thus, the main thrust of the decision to 
exclude was not based on Rule 16, but on Daubert and Rule 702.67 
The court criticized Nacchio for his argument that he was not on 
notice that Daubert issues had arisen as the trial began and the Rule 
16 disclosures were debated. The court cited numerous instances 
where mention or inference that Daubert issues were in play arose. 
The court was particularly scathing of Nacchio’s attempt to 
characterize the judge as having dismissed his expert testimony 
saying, “Nacchio is attempting to recast an unremarkable district 
court evidentiary ruling as an invidious act of judicial hubris. But it 
will not work.”68 
The court then held that Nacchio not only had notice that 
Daubert and Rule 702 issues were at play, but also had more than 
adequate opportunity to respond to these challenges. The court 
 
 61. Id. at 1241. 
 62. Id. at 1241–44. 
 63. Id. at 1242; see Nacchio I, 519 F.3d at 1153 (“The most straightforward reading of 
the transcript is that the judge excluded the evidence on Rule 16 grounds alone.”). 
 64. Nacchio II, 555 F.3d at 1242. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 1244. 
 68. Id. at 1247. 
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reviewed the timeline of the Rule 16 disclosures and the 
government’s challenge to the expert testimony and concluded that 
Nacchio had a series of opportunities to address the Daubert 
question.69 The en banc panel further concluded that if Nacchio felt 
he needed more time to address Daubert issues, he bore the burden 
of requesting more time.70 Consequently, after reviewing Nacchio’s 
revised Rule 16 disclosures, which provided the most comprehensive 
information regarding the expert testimony, the en banc panel 
concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court 
to exclude the expert testimony.71 Specifically, the court found that 
there was nothing in Nacchio’s disclosures that connected the 
expert’s experience to the ultimate conclusions he was making. The 
court reasoned that the lack of connection between the expert’s 
experience and his ultimate conclusion was essentially Nacchio asking 
the court to “take the expert’s word for it” with nothing more.72 
B. Petition for Certiorari 
Nacchio appealed the Tenth Circuit decision to the United 
States Supreme Court.73 The Supreme Court initially appeared to be 
interested in taking the case as it delayed decision on the petition for 
several months while it reviewed the issues in the case.74 Many 
commentators believed that this was a sign the Court would take the 
case because of the materiality issue.75 However, before the Court 
made its certiorari decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the district 
court’s calculations of Nacchio’s gains and forfeiture were 
erroneous.76 With the new instructions provided by the Tenth 
 
 69. Id. at 1250. 
 70. Id. at 1252. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1258. 
 73. Dionne Searcey, Hope Still Alive for Joe Nacchio, WSJ BLOGS, June 29, 2009, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/06/29/hope-still-alive-for-joe-nacchio/ (last visited Feb. 7, 
2010). On the last day of the 2009 term, the court failed to make a decision on the case, but 
requested the entire case file for review. Id. 
 74. Greg Avery, Supreme Court to Decide on Nacchio’s Request in October, DENVER  
BUS. J., July 10, 2009, available at http://denver.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2009/ 
07/13/story10.html. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Nacchio v. United States, 573 F.3d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 2009) (reversing and 
remanding the case back to the district court for a recalculation of Nacchio’s forfeiture and 
gains). 
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Circuit for calculating Nacchio’s punishment, his total prison term 
could be reduced from six years to three or four years, and his fine, 
which originally totaled fifty-two million dollars, could be reduced to 
forty-four million dollars.77 Federal prosecutors decided not to 
pursue an appeal on the issue of forfeiture and gains.78 The Supreme 
Court subsequently denied Nacchio’s petition for certiorari.79 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Two aspects of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion trouble many 
observers. First, many are concerned that the Tenth Circuit failed to 
recognize the differences in Rule 16 disclosures and the Daubert 
standard regarding expert witnesses.80 Second, the Tenth Circuit has 
broken new ground and, for the first time, has upheld the conviction 
of a corporate executive on the basis of “soft” information that 
questions public revenue projections. 
A. Expert Testimony 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge McConnell was particularly 
concerned that the Tenth Circuit had conflated the requirements for 
expert testimony in civil and criminal cases. Judge McConnell 
explained that in criminal cases, a defendant does not have to 
establish the foundation of an expert before trial, unless the district 
court directs the defendant to do so.81 Here, Nacchio was required 
to establish the foundation of his expert witness before trial during 
the pretrial debate over whether his Rule 16 disclosures were 
sufficient under the much more demanding Daubert standard. 
Additionally, Judge McConnell explained that the majority’s rule 
required Nacchio to satisfy the Daubert requirements for expert 
testimony through written declarations in advance of trial.82 Judge 
 
 77. Kevin O’Brien, Nacchio Gains a 10th Circuit Court Victory on his Sentence and 
Forfeiture, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG, Aug. 1, 2009, http://www.theracetothe 
bottom.org/criminal-law-and-governance/nacchio-gains-a-10th-circuit-court-victory-on-his-
sentence-a.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). 
 78. U.S. Government Won’t Fight Nacchio Sentence Ruling, REUTERS, Aug. 17, 2009, 
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McConnell reasoned that this requirement violated principles of 
criminal proceedings where a “defendant is entitled to keep his cards 
close to the vest.”83 Thus, Judge McConnell argued a defendant only 
has to make the most minimal disclosures during the pretrial phase 
so as not to lose his adversarial edge in withholding defense strategy 
until the last moment. Supporting this idea, Judge McConnell 
reasoned, that “[i]n criminal cases . . . neither side has a general right 
to discover the other’s evidence . . . .”84 
Further, as the three judge panel recognized,85 although “Rule 
16 provides the defense with some notice, the requirement of setting 
forth ‘the bases and reasons for’ the witnesses’ opinions does not 
track the methodological factors set forth by the Daubert Court.”86 
Rule 16, then, is a lesser standard, requiring little of the defendant. 
To comply with Rule 16 a defendant must only provide a basic 
summary of an expert’s qualifications and testimony. “In contrast to 
the detailed information that Daubert deemed essential,” one scholar 
has explained, “the disclosures in the [Rule 16] summary are apt to 
be too conclusory to educate [the other side] or . . . provide them 
with effective ammunition for cross-examination.”87 Moreover, as 
the three-judge panel recognized, “a Rule 16 disclosure need not be 
filed with the court, but only with opposing counsel.” 88 In the 
three-judge panel’s estimation, this makes it apparent that a Rule 16 
disclosure is “not intended to serve as the basis for a judicial 
determination regarding admissibility.”89 Thus, when the en banc 
panel upheld the district court’s treatment of a challenge to a Rule 
16 disclosure as a challenge under the Daubert standard, it subjected 
 
 83. Id. at 1259–60. 
 84. Id. at 1260. 
 85. United States v. Nacchio (Nacchio I), 519 F.3d 1140, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 86. Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. 
L. REV. 1345, 1360 (1994); see also United States v. Rich, 326 F. Supp. 2d 670, 677 (E.D. Pa. 
2004) (rejecting a defendant’s motion for a new trial partly on the basis that there was no 
authority supporting the idea that Rule 16 reports must independently meet Daubert 
requirements); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a 
Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1060–62 
(1994) (explaining that a pretrial conference in accordance with Rule 16 may be used to 
narrow pretrial disputes regarding expert testimony, a separate Daubert pretrial Daubert 
hearing is common before a judge determines the admissibility of expert testimony). 
 87. Berger, supra note 86, at 1360. 
 88. Nacchio I, 519 F.3d at 1151 (footnote omitted). 
 89. Id. 
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Nacchio’s Rule 16 filing to a much higher standard than is typical in 
criminal cases. 
Conversely, the majority argued that the district court’s 
treatment of the Rule 16 challenge as a challenge under Daubert was 
permissible because it was clear to Nacchio that the Rule 16 issue 
was no longer at play, rather the Daubert standard had been 
invoked. The majority reasoned that this was the case because of the 
numerous objections made by the government on the grounds of 
Daubert. Thus, it appears the court imposed a “constructive Daubert 
test” on Nacchio. Despite Nacchio’s constructive notice that 
Daubert was at issue, proper briefing of the Daubert issue never took 
place. The district judge indicated that the Rule 16 filings and the 
relevant party motions were all he needed to make a Daubert 
determination.90 This notwithstanding the accepted view that “Rule 
16 disclosure is not designed to allow the district court to move 
immediately to a Daubert determination without briefs, a hearing, or 
other appropriate means of testing the proposed expert’s 
methodology.”91 
 The new standard adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Nacchio’s 
case places defendants in the difficult situation of having to satisfy 
the Daubert standard for expert witnesses when they file their Rule 
16 disclosures, despite the important differences between criminal 
and civil cases and despite the traditional understanding that Rule 16 
disclosures are not a substitute for the more rigorous Daubert 
standard. The Tenth Circuit is alone in this requirement. 
B. Materiality and “Soft” Information 
Many consider this case to be unique in that it is the first time an 
individual has been convicted for trading on the basis of “soft” 
internal corporate information regarding future revenue estimates.92 
Nacchio supporters characterize this case as “the first time that a 
corporate insider has ever faced insider trading charges based purely 
on an internal debate regarding the accuracy of a prior public 
financial projection.”93 The Nacchio camp argues that if a conviction 
 
 90. Id. at 1150.  
 91. Id. at 1151.  
 92. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Nacchio v. United States, 519 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 07–1311). The information is 
labeled “soft” due to its uncertain nature. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2. 
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is allowed to stand based on this “soft” information, the floodgates 
will be open to both civil and criminal prosecutions against corporate 
officials. 
Future earnings estimates are unpredictable and difficult to 
gauge. For this reason, when Nacchio became aware that Qwest’s 
earning projections may have been overstated, there was no 
guarantee that Qwest would undoubtedly fall short of the earnings 
estimates. Nacchio could have led the company on a new path 
designed to increase ongoing revenue streams to meet earnings 
estimates. Thus, it is apparent that the future revenue projections 
were uncertain at best.94 
With this decision, the Tenth Circuit has entered into the 
dangerous waters of allowing individuals to be prosecuted on “soft” 
insider information, without announcing a standard for courts and 
juries to follow regarding the certainty of the “soft” information. 
The Nacchio case likely presents a bad example of why this prospect 
is dangerous, as it seems clear that Nacchio was aware that the one-
time revenue stream of IRUs was about to come to an end. And 
there is no information that Qwest had implemented any policy to 
improve revenue streams at the time Nacchio traded on the insider 
information. In other words, it was certain at the time Nacchio 
traded that there was a serious risk that Qwest would likely fall short 
of revenue projections and that Nacchio was not implementing the 
necessary changes to prevent earnings shortcomings. 
Nevertheless, future cases are likely to present a much closer call 
on whether the information is certain enough to be considered 
material inside information. One can easily imagine a situation where 
internal projections begin to show that a company will not meet its 
public earnings estimates, however, a company may be able to 
weather the storm and quickly change course to prevent a failure to 
meet revenue projections. Under the Tenth Circuit’s standard, while 
a company debates internal revenue projections, company officials 
would be forced to either refrain from selling their company shares 
for fear of prosecution or disclose the negative revenue projections to 
the investing public, no matter how speculative and uncertain the 
projections may be. Disclosing this negative information would 
inevitably cause a loss of investor confidence in a company’s ability to 
meet revenue projections, despite the fact the company could still 
 
 94. Searcey, supra note 73. 
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stem the loss and improve revenue streams. Accordingly, disclosure 
of a potential earnings shortfall would become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy dooming a company to an earnings shortfall. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, in denying certiorari in the 
Nacchio case, missed an opportunity to develop a more distinct 
standard for juries to determine whether “soft” information in the 
form of internal revenue projections is certain enough to expose 
company officers to potential insider trading liability. 
Amicus briefs offered helpful suggestions to the Supreme Court 
during the certiorari stage for developing a uniform jury instruction 
capable of adequately measuring the materiality of internal revenue 
projections. Specifically, the Washington Legal Foundation has 
suggested that in an insider trading case based on “soft” 
information, the trial court should instruct the jury that to be 
material, new revenue data must be “‘so certain’ that . . . the 
previously publicly announced forecast no longer had a ‘reasonable 
basis.’”95 This would be a practical instruction that would allow the 
jury to successfully evaluate the “probability” and “magnitude”96 of 
the “soft” information available to the defendant when he traded. 
Because materiality is such an indefinite concept, particularly in the 
context of “soft” information, more exacting jury instructions are 
needed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Joseph Nacchio is certainly not a sympathetic character. Many 
view his conviction a “victory over greedy corporate chieftains.”97 
However, the Tenth Circuit’s decisions in the Nacchio line of cases 
will impact corporate officials who are honestly trying to comply 
with insider trading laws, and will generally lead to greater confusion 
in the Tenth Circuit for juries and judges when faced with complex 
insider trading issues. 
First, in Nacchio II, the Tenth Circuit conflated the requirements 
of Rule 16 disclosures and the requirements for qualifying experts 
under the Daubert standard. Accordingly, an onerous burden has 
been placed on defendants to satisfy the high Daubert standard at an 
 
 95. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 92, at 16. 
 96. Id.; see Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 97. See U.S. Government Won’t Fight Nacchio Sentence Ruling, supra note 78. 
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early stage of a trial. Conflating these two standards will mean that 
some defendants who believe they have complied with Rule 16 
disclosures will later be surprised to find that their expert is unable to 
testify because they failed to comply with Daubert, nor will they be 
given a second chance to do so. Thus, defendants in the Tenth 
Circuit must ensure that they comply with the Daubert requirements 
at an earlier stage in the trial than is required by any other circuit 
court. 
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit’s en banc decision regarding 
materiality in the “soft” information context will leave lower court 
juries and judges uncertain about how to decide the fate of corporate 
insiders guilty of trading company stock on the basis of uncertain 
internal corporate revenue projections. Further, the precedent set by 
the Tenth Circuit in the Nacchio case could have the negative effect 
of discouraging companies from disclosing optimistic or ambitious 
revenue projections to the public out of fear that making trades 
while internal documents question the accuracy of the projections 
will leave officers potentially liable for insider trading violations. This 
will mean that investors will have less information as they make their 
investment decisions. Accordingly, a new standard requiring that 
“soft” information be certain to a high-degree before insider trading 
liability can attach is appropriate to avoid the chilling effect that will 
likely come to corporate insiders doing business in the Tenth Circuit.  
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